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Abstract 
 
This paper reports aggregate bank excess liquidity preference curves for the pre-crisis and 
crisis periods. It is argued that the flat curve reflects a threshold lending rate at which 
point banks accumulate reserves passively. Moreover, the expansion of reserves – when 
the lending rate threshold is binding – does not lead to credit expansion. The latter would 
require policies that directly increase the demand for loans, particularly by the business 
sector.  
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1. Introduction 
Recently there have been several contributions regarding the cause and 
consequences of the massive accumulation of excess bank reserves in the United States.  
The data from the Federal Reserve indicate a spectacular and sustained build up of excess 
reserves since the third quarter of 2008. Keister and McAndrews (2009) note that the 
total level of reserves in the banking system is “determined almost entirely by the actions 
of the central bank and not affected by private banks’ lending decisions” (p.2). In other 
words, the accumulation of reserves reflects the Federal Reserve’s policy actions rather 
than commercial banks’ inaction. Moreover, Keister and McAndrews (2009) underscore 
the passive nature of the reserve accumulation that need not be inflationary. 
On the inflation question, Keister et al (2008) explain that the Federal Reserve 
could still make monetary policy effective by paying banks interest on reserves1. This 
policy creates a floor interest rate that allows the central bank to maintain an influence 
over market conditions in spite of the significant excess reserves and the broken 
relationship between bank reserves and the money supply.  Furthermore, according to the 
aforementioned authors, the payment of interest on bank reserves provides an opportunity 
for the central bank to use two instruments – bank reserves to address bank panics and the 
floor interest rate to deal with inflationary pressures.  
Nevertheless, several analysts have noted the potential inflationary effects of 
excess reserves – for instance Meltzer (2009) and Feldstein (2009).  In past studies, 
however, several observers have noted that the inflationary effects depend on whether the 
demand for excess reserves represents desired or undesired quantities (see Lindley et al 
20012; Mounts et al 2000). For instance, an expansion of desired excess reserves would 
lead to credit and money supply expansion, which could engender inflationary pressures. 
On the other hand, undesired reserves would be demanded as excess reserves and have no 
effect on the money supply.   
Utilizing a similar idea, Agenor et al (2004) estimate an excess bank liquidity 
function for Thailand in order to determine whether the rapid contraction of bank credit, 
                                                 
1 The same point was also made in Keister and McAndrews (2009).   
 
2 Lindley et al (2001) also did a brief review of the literature pertaining to the two camps of researchers 
espousing the views of desired (active) versus undesired (passive) excess reserves. 
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after the Asian financial crisis, was due to a credit crunch (supply phenomenon) or due to 
a contraction in private sector demand for loans. The latter would imply that the excess 
liquidity demand by banks is involuntary, passive or undesired3.  Recently, Edlin and 
Jaffee (2009) note that the accumulation of excess reserves to “dizzying heights” reflects 
a credit crunch; therefore, they recommend that policies be instituted to facilitate credit 
expansion from excess reserves as this could be an alternative source of economic 
stimulus instead of the fiscal operation.   
             This essay sets out to explain that the credit contraction could be the result of a 
flat excess bank liquidity function at a threshold lending rate.  In other words, excess 
reserves become a perfect or near perfect substitute for loans at a rate of interest above 
zero. Therefore, a horizontal curve is indicative of a passive accumulation of excess 
reserves vis-à-vis the loan rate.  The paper, moreover, proffers a simple analytical 
framework which shows that the stimulation of bank lending may not depend in inducing 
commercial banks to lend more via monetary expansion, but in stimulating the private 
sector’s demand for credit along the threshold lending rate.  Once the threshold rate is 
binding, policies that shift outward the demand for loans also increase borrowers’ surplus 
that is favourable for stimulating business investments – assuming the incentives are 
given to investors who produce real output.    
              Of course, the idea of a flat liquidity (or cash) demand curve is not new. It was 
proposed by Keynes (1936, pp. 207-208, reprinted 1994) as the liquidity trap.  However, 
while Keynes wrote about perfect substitution between cash and bonds (at zero bond 
rate), this essay looks at the relationship between bank excess reserves and the lending 
rate.  In addition, examining liquidity preference vis-à-vis the lending rate makes it 
possible to link conceptually excess reserves and credit.   
2. Bank excess liquidity curves 
In order to extract the excess liquidity preference curves, the technique of locally 
weighted least squares regressions, as outlined by Cleveland (1993), is utilized.  Robust 
weights were used to minimize the effects of outliners on the curve.  A smoothing 
parameter of 0.3 was also used in order to fit the curves.  Cleveland (1993, p. 98) 
                                                 
 
3 Note that Keister and McAndrews (2009) argue that excess reserves are induced passively by Federal 
Reserve policy.  
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explains some factors that could determine the choice of the smoothing parameter. This 
article utilized a parameter such that undue wiggles in the fitted curve are avoided. Two 
curves are fitted. The first is for the pre-financial crisis era over the period 1980 to 2006: 
Dec (monthly data). Using a longer data set (pre-1980) does not alter the basic finding 
that the curve tends to flatten at a minimum threshold loan rate.  For the crisis period, the 
curve is fitted using data from January 2007 to September 2009 for the purpose of 
maximizing observations. A chronicle of the events surrounding the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis might lead one to start the crisis period at around June 2007 (see Brunnermeier 
2009 for a review of the events). However, this article uses January 2007 as the starting 
period for the purpose of extracting the aggregate bank liquidity preference curve – doing 
so does not change the results in any fundamental way but allows for a few more 
observations. It also does not change the pre-crisis curve fundamentally if we add the six 
observations of 2007 to that period.     
Figure 1 presents the pre-crisis aggregate liquidity preference curve. Two 
outliners were removed from the data when fitting this curve – those are September 2001 
and August 2003.  This figure suggests a threshold rate of approximately 6% as the curve 
becomes flat around that point.  The liquidity preference curve during the crisis has a 
similar pattern (with fewer data points of course) but the flat segment occurs at a lower 
lending rate at approximately 3.25% (see Figure 2).  This would suggest that the 
expansion of reserves possibly had a liquidity effect on the threshold rate, especially 
given that risk would have increased during the crisis.     
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Figure 1. Pre-crisis bank liquidity preference – monthly data Jan: 1980 to Dec: 2006 
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Data source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/) 
  
 
 
Figure 2. Liquidity preference during financial crisis – monthly data Jan: 2007 to Sep: 
2009 
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Data source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/) 
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3. Monetary expansion and the threshold rate 
 The idea proposed in this section is based on the notion that the threshold rate 
represents a minimum at which non-remunerated cash and interest earning loans are 
perfectly substitutable4.  If we view banks as profit maximizing entities rather than 
rational portfolio investors – as we were urged to do by Sealey and Lindley (1977) – then 
the argument presented here might be palpable.  At what point, therefore, is the threshold 
loan rate binding whereby the expansion of reserves result in the passive accumulation of 
such reserves rather than lending at some rate? In other words, what determines the 
threshold lending rate at which point the risk adjusted marginal cost of banking is just 
equal to the lending rate?  It is postulated here that the minimum rate, at which point the 
liquidity preference curve is flat, is determined by the marginal cost of banking and risk.   
This is the rate at which point all liquidity effects from the monetary expansion are 
exhausted.  
   
 The model herein presented encapsulates this notion by linking reserves and 
credit via the lending rate. Figure 3 shows that the threshold rate occurs at Tr , which 
becomes the effective supply of loans. The demand curve for excess reserves is given by 
DR  and it becomes flat at Tr , which represents the effective supply curve (or threshold 
supply curve) of loans. Moreover, Tr represents the rate at which all liquidity effects have 
been exhausted by the monetary expansion.  It furthermore represents the supply of 
loanable funds by banks. In other words, the rate is determined by banks that possess the 
market power (oligopoly power) to determine rate and the private sector accepts the rate5. 
The banks, while determining the rate at which they lend, must consider marginal cost of 
production, risk and liquidity conditions. 
          The supply of reserves by the central bank is given by SR . When DR = SR the 
equilibrium quantity of reserves is determined as *R .  The demand for loans is denoted 
                                                 
4 Of course, starting from October 2008 interest is paid on excess reserves.  However, we still see the 
general downward sloping and eventually flat curve when excess reserves are graphed against the lending 
rate.   
5 There is evidence of the existence of market power in the US banking industry – see for instance Hannan 
and Berger (1991).  
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by DL . The downward sloping curve reflects the idea that an increase in the lending rate 
decreases the present value of future profit flows of businesses. The converse is occurs 
when the loan rate falls. It also reflects that household discounted future cash flows fall 
when the mortgage rate (or the rate on consumer credit) increases. A decline in the 
mortgage rate has the opposite effect on households. The intersection of DL and Tr gives 
the equilibrium level of credit ( *L ).     
Figure 3 indicates that a monetary contraction from SR to 2SR  leads to an increase 
in the lending rate above threshold to 1r . Consequently, credit is contracted from 
*L to *1L .  
On the other hand, a monetary expansion from SR to 1SR leads to no further decrease in 
the lending rate as the minimum threshold rate is now binding. Credit expansion stops at 
*L and excess reserves are accumulated passively.  Therefore, once the threshold rate is 
reached credit intermediation would require that policies directly stimulate the demand 
for loans along this rate. The demand curve shifts out from DL to 1DL .  In addition, 
borrower surplus – bounded by the area under the loan demand curve and above Tr  – 
increases when the demand for credit shifts outward. However, the surplus would 
diminish as the interest rate rises above the threshold as liquidity conditions tighten.  
 
Figure 3. The threshold rate and loanable funds 
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4. Conclusion 
The analysis suggests that at the binding threshold rate, liquidity injections would 
not engender credit expansion.  The threshold rate was postulated to occur when the 
extracted liquidity demand curve – using the method of locally weighted least squares 
regressions – is horizontal thus reflecting perfect substitution between cash and interest 
earning loans to the private sector.  At this point the reserve accumulation is passive, 
decreases the money multiplier, and therefore is unlikely to be inflationary.  Expanding 
credit would require policies that directly increase the demand for loans, particularly by 
the private business sector.  As the demand for loans increase along the threshold rate, the 
surplus of borrowers increases.  However, the surplus diminishes as liquidity conditions 
tighten and interest rate rises above threshold. 
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